

Message Text

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ACTION OES-07

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NRC-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 SOE-02
AID-05 CEA-01 COME-00 EB-08 DOE-15 H-01 INR-10
INT-05 L-03 OMB-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 STR-07
TRSE-00 ACDA-12 /115 W
-----008052 140903Z /23

O R 140727Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 907
INFO AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMCOOSNQ MADRAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 5816

FOLLOWING RECD FROM BOMBAY DATED APRIL 13, 1978 BEING
RPTD TO YOU.

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOMBAY 0929

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: TECH, IN
SUBJ: NUCLEAR AFFAIRS TALK WITH SETHNA

1. ON APRIL 12, SETHNA MET WITH VISITING EMBASSY DCM BLOOD AND
DEPARTMENTAL INDIA DESK OFFICER THIBAUT, WHO WERE ACCOMPANIED
BY CONGEN. MOST OF TIME WAS SPENT REVIEWING FAMILIAR POLICY
DIFFERENCES AND POSITIONS, BUT FOLLOWING POINTS WERE WORTH NOTING:
A) SETHNA INDICATED THAT GOI IS CLOSELY STUDYING CONDITIONS
WHICH MIGHT DEVELOP AND WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE AN ABROGATION OF
ONE OR MORE OF THE THREE AGREEMENTS COVERING U.S. SUPPORT FOR
TARAPUR (AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION OF 1963; FUEL SUPPLY CONTRACT,
AND AID LOAN AGREEMENT). IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT HE DOES NOT
HAVE IN MIND ANY POINT OR ACTION THAT WOULD DEFINITELY
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CONSTITUTE AN ABROGATION. I STILL SEEMS TO BE FIRM INDIAN
POLICY TO AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT TAINT THEIR RECORD OF
SCRUPULOUSLY LIVING UP T TERMS OF THE AGREEMENTS. SETHNA IS
CONCERNED OVER THE PRESSURES IN THE INDIAN PRESS AND PARLIAMENT
FOR REPROCESSING AND INSISTED THAT U.S. HAS OBLIGATION TO REPLY
TO IAEC LETTERS OF AUGUST 21, 1976, AND DECEMBER 24, 1976
(BOMBAY 2277, AUGUST 26, 1976, RELAYED TO DEPT. AS NEW DELHI

12609), REQUESTING A JOINT DETERMINATION. WE MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT ON MANY OCCASIONS, PARTICULARLY DURING DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY NYE'S VISIT OF LAST AUGUST, THAT HIGH U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD GOI THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF U.S. AGREEMENT TO REPROCESSING. NEVERTHELESS, HE PERSISTED IN HIS VIEW THAT U.S. HAS OBLIGATION OF ADDRESSING THIS MATTER DIRECTLY BY REPLYING TO IAEC'S INQUIRIES.

B) SETHNA WAS NOT INCLINED TO GIVE ANY PRECISE REASONS FOR IAEC RESISTANCE TO FULLSCOPE SAFEGUARDS. SEVERAL TIMES DURING CONVERSATION HE REPEATED THAT IEAC DOES NOT WANT "SOMEONE LOOKING OVER THEIR SHOULDERS" UNDER DIECRIMINATORY INSPECTION SYSTEM. HOWEVER, ON A COUPLE OF OCCASIONS HE SAID THAT U.S. NONPROLIFERATION ACT IN EFFECT FORBIDS THE PRODUCTION OR RETENTION OF PLUTONIUM. HE ADMITTED THAT THIS POINT WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE WIDELY HELD VIEW AMONG IAEC SCIENTISTS THAT FULLSCOPE SAFEGUARDS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FAST BREEDER, WHICH IS CENTRAL TO INDIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM. HOWEVER, TO BACK UP THIS CONTENTION SETHNA WOULD NOT GO BEYOND STATING THAT ONE HAS TO READ BETWEEN THE LINES OF THE ACT TO REACH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT AGREE TO NATIONAL PLUTONIUM PROCESSING. OTHER CONTACTS HAVE TOLD THE CONGEN THAT SETHNA HAS DEFENDED THIS INTERPRETATION ON THE BASIS OF SECTION 129 (1) D OF NON PROFLIFERATION ACT WHICH READS: "NO NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT OR SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY SHALL BE EXPORTED TO ANY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE THAT IS FOUND BY PRESIDENT TO HAVE AT ANY TIME AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE

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OF THIS SECTION, ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SOURCE OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND HAVING DIRECT SIGNFICANCE FOR THE MANUFACTURE OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES...". APPARENTLY INDIANS FEAR THIS PROVISION COULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST THEIR PLAN FOR NATIONAL PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM (FROM HEAVY WATER REACTORS, NOT TARAPUR).

C) SETHAN TOLD US THAT SHAH NOW ADMITS ERROR IN ESTIMATING RE-RACKING COST OF TARAPUR POOLS AT \$3 MILLION. SETHNA AGREED THAT THIS TASK CAN BE DONE FOR UNDER \$1 MILLION. HOWEVER, SETHNA SAID THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO CORRECT THE RECORD IMMEDIATELY AS THIS MATTER IS NOT NOW OPERATIONAL. (BOMBAY 661, MARCT 15 REPEATED TO DEPARTMENT AS NEW DELHI 4167).

D) FOR FIRST TIME IN CONVERSATION WITH U.S. OFFICIALS SETHNA WAS DIRECTLY CRITICAL OF BARC DIRECTOR RAMANNA. HE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO TROUBLE IN CHOOSING A REPLACEMENT AS THERE ARE MANY QUALIFIED PEOPLE. HE DISMISSED IDEA THAT REPLACEMENT HAD TO BE A SCIENTIST OF RAMANNA'S CALIBER. SETHNA NAMED A LARGE NUMBER OF GOI OFFICIALS WHO HAD COME UP THROUGH THE RANKS OF THE IAEC AND MOVED ON TO OTHER TOP POSITIONS IN INDIA, E.G. PRASAD OF ONGC. HE ADDED THAT REPLACEMENT WILL BE SELECTED ON BASIS HIS RECOMMENDATION. IN DENIGATING RAMANNA SETHNA REMARKED THAT LATTER AT LEAST HAD SKILL TO ORGANIZE 50 OF HIS RELATIVES TO WAGE A LETTER-

WRITING CAMPAGIN ON HIS BEHALF.

E) SETHNA SAID THAT IN VIEW OF OUR INTEREST IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO VIET NAM WE WOULD PROBABLY LIKE TO KNOW THAT THE VIET-NAMESE HAD NOT FOLLOWED UP ON INDIA'S OFFER OF THREE OR FOUR TRAINING SLOTS. SETHNA INSISTED THAT VIET NAM AS A FOUNDING MEMBER OF IAEA'S SOUTH ASIA GROUPING HAD RIGHT TO SEEK THIS TRAINING AND INDIA WOULD BE HARD PUT TO REFUSE IT, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF PREVIOUS SUPER-POWER HELP TO VIET NAM IN NUCLEAR AREA. HE SAID THAT IF VIETNAM PURSUED TRAINING OFFER IT WOULD BE IN NON-SENSITIVE AREAS PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED AND WOULD BE TAILORED TO VIET NAM NEEDS RATHER THAN SIMPLY SLOTS IN CONTINUING TRAINING PROGRAMS.

F) SETHNA CLOSED BY SAYING THAT HE SUPPOSED THAT THE 7.6 TONS OF URANIUM WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD PROMISED WOULD
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BE SHIPPED BUT HE WAS NOT AT ALL HOPEFUL OF ANYTHING BEYOND THAT. HE SAID THAT THE CONTINUING DELAY IN THE PRESENT SHIPMENT HAS CAUSED A LOT OF PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESS AND THE PARLIAMENT; ONLY MORARJI'S SKILL AND TOUGH WAY OF HANDLING PARLIAMENTARIANS HAS PREVENTED EVEN FURTHER CLAMOR ON NEW DELHI. COURTNEY UNQUOTE
GOHEEN

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NNN

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